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Abstract
The African continent has significantly suffered from a great number of civil wars and armed
conflicts since the beginning of the independence era in late 1960s. On May 28, 1975, the
creation of a regional The African continent has significantly suffered from a great number of
civil wars and armed conflicts since organization in West Africa called the Economic
Community of West Africa States (ECOWAS) took place. The intent was to achieve "collective
self-sufficiency" for its member states by building a full economic and trading union. In the late
1990s, the maintenance of peace and security in the region was added to the ECOWAS mission
statement. This thesis focuses on the important collaboration between the United Nations (UN)
and the Economic Community of West Africa States (ECOWAS) in resolving conflicts on the
African continent. This subject is quite relevant today and this thesis examines the history and
political achievements of the cooperation between the UN and ECOWAS in two cases, Liberia
and The Gambia where both organizations were involved.

I argue here that while the relationship between the United Nations and ECOWAS has
developed over time, the UN has been slow in responding to crises in West Africa. I use Liberia
as a case in point. However, I also argue that the UN has begun to realize the need to collaborate
with this regional organization as demonstrated in my second case of The Gambia. I believe that
preventive action combined with military deployment, if necessary, under the auspices of the
UN, the African Union (AU) and ECOWAS can ensure peace, security, civilian human rights,
rule of law and democracy in West Africa. The joint actions of these international organizations
should be formalized in the form of a joint framework, based in West Africa.
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Chapter I: Introduction
The UN has implemented peacekeeping operations since 1948 and the Charter gives the
United Nations Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international
peace and security. According to the manual entitled United Nations Peacekeeping Operations
(UNPO), Principles and Guidelines, issued in 2008 “United Nations peacekeeping operations are
deployed on the basis of a mandate from the United Nations Security Council. The tasks that a
United Nations peacekeeping operation will be required to perform are set out in the Security
Council mandate.” (UNPO, 2008, 16). Although the United Nations has developed several
important programs in West Africa, it did not always manage these peacekeeping operations in
the most optimal manner. Despite the UN’s economic programs and military missions, the UN
has at times been weak in achieving the resolution of crises in West Africa. UN Peacekeeping
operations that have taken place in West Africa including Western Sahara (1992), Liberia, Sierra
Leone, Côte d’Ivoire, and recently The Gambia. The United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia
(UNOMIL) was initially implemented in cooperation with ECOWAS from 1993 to 1997 during
the first Liberian civil war. Therefore, the UN and ECOWAS have been working together for
some time.
According to a UN Council Special Report (CSR) submitted by selected experts,
peacekeeping operations “undertake critical missions, including stabilizing countries wracked by
violence, protecting civilians, facilitating humanitarian assistance, degrading illegal armed
groups, running elections, and supporting public security and the rule of law.” (CSR, 2017, 1).
UN peacekeeping operations have made an important contribution to peace and security and the
UN cooperation with regional organizations such as ECOWAS enhances that effort. For this
thesis, an analysis of this relationship is undertaken using the case of Liberia as an example.
7

Free and democratic elections have been essential element of peace agreements. Every year,
free and democratic elections are held in West Africa as a number of countries organize local or
even national elections. Very often, however, the political transition between incoming and
outgoing governments can lead to an outbreak of violence, calling for an intervention of
peacekeepers from ECOWAS and the UN. In addition to providing security and election
monitoring, the UN has conducted social, economic and development programs (UNICEF,
UNDP, UNHCR) in West African countries.

Together with regional organizations, namely ECOWAS and the Economic and Monetary
Union of West African countries (UEMOA in French), UN programs include currently
preventive actions intended to avoid electoral violence that potentially can lead to civil wars.
The auditing of the pre-electoral processes such as voter registration and establishing the
electoral map have been key. Also, UN-ECOWAS monitoring and observation during the
elections are essential instruments to prevent the return of civil violence. For example, following
the two bloody civil wars in Liberia, the UN and ECOWAS played a major role in overseeing
new elections. In addition, the most recent example of violence following an election that will be
discussed later in this thesis is the 2016 presidential election in The Gambia.
However, the UN comes into the region as an outsider. In this regard, UN offices on the
ground have not been well-equipped to comprehend local cultural factors and assess the risks of
clashes between the local groups. Since 1989, however, the United Nations field offices in West
Africa and ECOWAS have developed a synergy to put in place successful and effective policies.
The Economic Community of West Africa States (ECOWAS) has been a significant player as a
regional organization by providing local knowledge.
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The effectiveness of ECOWAS policies relies on the use of inclusiveness and preventive
diplomacy. I argue here that UN/ECOWAS cooperation has worked well but has been less
efficient due to rules, regulations, and lack of communication that have slowed decision-making.

Peacekeeping operations are very important in West Africa in order to maintain peace
and security in accordance with United Nations Charter. Lise Morjé Howard, for example,
argues the need for the coordination of “legal capabilities” must be taken into consideration
when joint institutions work together on the ground. Therefore, UN Security Council mandates
must include legal provisions for ECOWAS. In fact, my argument supports Howard’s theory that
there must be “basic organizational learning on the ground” (Howard, 2008, 18). I looked at the
political implications of ECOWAS in the resolution of conflicts in Liberia in the 1990s and the
2000s and in The Gambia in 2017 and the support provided by the United Nations in both cases,
and argue that communication between ECOWAS, UN Headquarters and field offices remains
absolutely a key component for the success of peacekeeping operations.
In addition, Howard clearly explains the relationship between the sustained interest of the
UN Security Council and successes on the ground. Also Howard discusses in-depth the
cooperation and communication between field offices in the region or country where the issue is
located and UN headquarters. I agree with Howard’s claim that the effectiveness of UN organs
on the grounds and their ability to learn quickly and adjust to new problems is essential for
success. Also, regional organizations like ECOWAS have advantages that the UN may lack, in
terms of primary knowledge of the situation and familiarity with local people, leaders and
institutions that can contribute to a solution. Nevertheless, the UN can contribute funding, clear
and specific mandates and international legitimacy.
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Methodology
In gathering my resources for this research, I will rely on academic writings, scholarly
reviewed books, UN reports, ECOWAS publications and expert committees’ contributions to
sustain my hypothesis. I expect these sources will reveal the success or failure of UN/ECOWAS
cooperation in both Liberia and The Gambia and will uncover a lack of coordination between
ECOWAS and the UN. The Liberia case demonstrates that UN mechanisms of communication
with the field and its partnership with ECOWAS may not have taken into consideration the
sociological realities in West African communities.
Also, data will be collected from UN studies and other regional organizations that provide
data related to the budgeting, the size of the police force and military deployments in both cases.
I will also gather information from reports and peer-reviewed publications related to the
outcomes from the implementation of the joint policies (ECOWAS-UN) and projects overseen
by the officers on the ground. In conclusion, I explore the lessons learned from the outcomes of
those programs before making policy recommendations.
Studying the following cases of Liberia and The Gambia will help to demonstrate all
necessary changes needed for a better managed cooperation between ECOWAS and United
Nations. I will examine the historical backgrounds, UN Security Council resolutions that
supported or at times undermined on ECOWAS mechanisms for the deployment of troops and
the mandate of ECOMOG. At the conclusions of the case studies, I will propose some policy
recommendations based on the evidence reported by major agencies on the ground.
In my conclusion, I suggest building an international framework and international
arrangements that would facilitate political cooperation between Economic Commission of West
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African States and the United Nations and support the successful achievement of their joint
missions.
Since the tenure of former UN Secretary-General Ban-Ki Moon, UN agencies have studied
many ways to improve their relationship with ECOWAS member states. Compared with other
African regional organizations, ECOWAS has strongly advocated for more freedom of action.
However, ECOWAS lacks major funding, available and unified military capabilities and
strategies to prevent effectively civil wars. I argue that ECOWAS needs more freedom of actions
and needs full support by the United Nations in order to handle all emerging crises in a timely
manner. ECOWAS has gained international accountability while intervening in member states in
order restore order, peace and security. Beyond working with the UN, ECOWAS has worked
closely with African Union (AU) bodies to maintain multilateral frameworks for awareness of
imminent dangers and the adoption of effective preventive mechanisms.
However, that inclusive process requires an extended inter-agency cooperation between
ECOWAS, AU and UN to prevent any delay by member states due to bureaucracy and selfish
political interests. Preventive action is now a major consideration by UN, AU and ECOWAS
organizations in order to prevent civil wars. It is hoped that this thesis will shed light on how to
improve these efforts.
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Chapter II: Review of literature
UN reports and peer-reviewed readings discussed below demonstrate that the UN has
failed at times to decide efficiently on how to handle sudden outbreaks of unrest that have led to
bloody consequences. This thesis focuses on two case studies, Liberia and The Gambia, to
explain the roles of the UN and ECOWAS, including their cooperation in the implementation of
joint programs.
Lise Morjé Howard argues that UN military forces and civilian organizations on the
ground should cooperate with the local leadership and should have more legal capacity for
decision-making. Howard’s primary interest is in how UN personnel learned to “to recognize
tho0s dynamics and so alter the goals of the warring parties, and change the UN operations on
the ground in light of new understandings of problems”. (Howard, 2008, 19). The fast adoption
of effective resolutions for peacekeeping operations with strong and clear mandates depends on
the interests of the Security Council members. The UN Security Council’s interest in a matter is
likely related the level and the nature of the diplomatic relationships between UN five permanent
(P5) members and the country hosting the civil war. In fact, the Economic Community of West
African States (ECOWAS) has been very diligent in exercising preventive action with the
support of United Nations. In addition, Howard argues that the willingness of all parties to
resolve their disagreements peacefully is very critical to the success of UN peacekeeping
operations. The benefits of such analysis, are shown by Howard’s fine study of six cases in
which UN peacekeeping was successful, mainly in 1990s (Namibia, El Salvador, Cambodia,
Mozambique, Eastern Slovenia, and East Timor).
In reference to those UN peacekeeping operations around the world, Howard mentions that
field offices were reporting to UN Headquarters to call urgently for political actions to prevent
12

the civil war. The expected emergency response by the UN Security Council has often failed to
meet high expectations of local communities and civilians who are major victims and
neighboring states in the cases of Liberia and The Gambia.
In complement to Howard, a UN Council Special Report (CSR), dated in 2017, mentions, in
light of recent “peacekeeping partnership” (CSR, 2017, 8), that members states to UN
peacekeeping operations fail, often times, to cooperate effectively with host-country
governments. This report proposes many urgent mechanisms that must be adopted by UN organs
in order to guarantee a successful implementation of peacekeeping operations, mostly in Africa.
In fact, Article 39 of the UN Charter authorizes the UN Security Council to determine the
existence of a threat to “the peace, breach of peace, or act of aggression.” (United Nations, 1948,
1). In addition, the CSR reports, “international division of labor during peacekeeping operations
is controversial and unsustainable. Countries that mandate United Nations (UN) missions are
often different from those that provide the uniformed personnel and contribute major funding.”
(CSR, 2017, 3). This report mentions also deep disagreements between Security Council
members, financial contributors (member states as donors). There are also strained relations
between UN financial offices accounted for funding management and the host country
government. Misunderstandings related to administrative hierarchy, personnel assignments and
decision-making processes arise also between host country governmental bodies and UN
agencies on the ground.
In addition, troubles arose between UN field offices and deployed ECOWAS forces while
implementing legal mechanisms. This is due to their different types of military hierarchy and
administrative reporting systems.
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Paul D Williams (2013) has conducted in-depth research on the causes of civil wars and
mechanisms of peacekeeping operations in Africa. He also studied the military contributions by
African countries and the support provided by the United Nations. Williams mentions more than
50 peace operations that included the protection of civilians, conflict prevention, ceasefire
enforcement and the implementation of peace agreements. Out of these fifty peace operations,
ten took place or are still ongoing in West Africa. After exploring the Liberia and The Gambia
cases, I will mention the current level of cooperation in terms peacekeeping operations and
provide policy recommendations for more successful outcomes in terms of civilians’ security and
democratic rule of law. Jeremy Sarkin claims that “in the 45 years to 2001, 80 successful and
108 unsuccessful coups took place in Africa, nearly half them in West Africa” (Sarkin, 2009, 2).
This proves that UN has always been focused on peace and stability in Africa. In order to deal
with this persistent instability, Sarkin claims that “placing peacekeepers on the ground” can be a
solution to prevent crises in countries facing poverty, food shortage and lack of access to potable
water and protect human rights of their citizens. Sarkin claims also, “while in 2002 there were
31,000 peacekeepers on the ground in Africa (from the UN and AU), the number was more than
60,000 by 2007.”(Sarkin, 2009, 18). Sarkin’s observation makes sense and supports the idea that
the size and the strength of deployed peacekeepers makes a difference.
The types of the mandate are provided depending on the conditions on the ground and the
full cooperation with the host country government. This assertion has been historically
confirmed by the delayed reaction of UN Security Council in 1993 to the civil war in Liberia. In
fact, the United Nations Security Council only adopted its first resolution in 1993 to support
ECOMOG whose forces were deployed in Liberia in 1991. Local populations blamed UN
reaction and denounced an unfair treatment.
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Chapter III: Liberia: Case study of a long ongoing civil war
This chapter examines Liberia’s first civil war from 1989 to 1997. The Armed Forces of
Liberia, the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) and Independent National Patriotic Front
of Liberia (INPFL), among others, and the ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee (SMC)
formed by state members were the major players during the civil wars in Liberia.
However, those main components underwent changes during the second civil war due to the
strong influence of UNOMIL in 1993 that later became UNMIL in 2003. This chapter does not
include the relationships between the Liberian civil war and the crisis in Sierra Leone. It focuses
on the great contributions of ECOWAS and the UN to end peacefully the civil wars in Liberia
and their joint efforts to enforce UNMIL peacekeeping operations that prevented chaos in the
region and restored order after free, fair and democratic elections.
A: History of the conflict:
Liberia’s civil crisis goes far back in Liberian history to 1979. Nathalie Brown recalls that
“in 1980, Samuel Doe, a 28-year old Master Sergeant in the Liberian National Guard, led a coup
d'état” (Brown:1999:7). Doe and his followers stormed the executive mansion, assassinated
President Tolbert and his immediate security forces, and formed a revolutionary government.
The bicameral Parliament of Liberia, known as the Legislature, was dissolved in April 1980.
This was the beginning of a dictatorship that divided the country.
Samuel Doe was from the Krahn ethnic group. Clashes erupted consequently between some
ethnic groups during a period of tension marked by political instability, social crisis and waves of
protests. It was mostly visible in 1985 when ethnic groups namely, Gios, Manos and other
minorities in the Nimba County started waging war among themselves. Among them, the Gios
and Manos were the most influential groups. In November 1983, Thomas Quiwonkpa, a former
15

comrade who fell out with Samuel Doe, fled the country and went into exile in the United
States. Global Security’s report mentions “under pressure from the United States and other
creditors, in July 1984, Doe’s government issued a new constitution that allowed the return of
political parties outlawed since 1980.”(GlobalSecurity, 2018, 1). All political parties that had
rebelled came back to demand a change in government.
At this time, each candidate was supported by his ethnic group in accordance with its
cultural rules. Each ethnic group or coalition of ethnic groups had its own candidate for the
presidential election that was held on October 15, 1985. Gios and Mandingos claimed that
President Samuel Doe’s regime rigged the presidential election. The majority of the international
community shared that view. The U.S. embassy in Monrovia under the leadership of H.E.
Ambassador Edwards Perkins deployed nine observers but refused to comment on the results of
the 1985 presidential election. No international observers declared the 1985 presidential election
as free and fair.
Reports by international organizations such as ECOWAS and non-governmental
organizations namely Amnesty International (AI) and Human Rights Watch (HRW) agree that
the roots of the Liberian civil wars are also related to income inequalities, uneven access to
property and the management of natural resources. The United Nations Common Country
Assessment that was conducted in 2006 identified some key conflict dynamics in terms of factors
that accounted for the violent conflict. For example, the Krahn and Mandingo ethnic groups were
well known for trading and business relationships and dominated the market. The relationship
between economic power and ethnic distribution of wealth, unequal management of resources
exacerbated the viral competition between ethnic groups with different intents and ambitions.
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This cocktail of factors led to a bloody civil war between Samuel Doe’s supporters and those of
Charles Ghankay Taylor.
A Human Rights Watch report (1993) claims that President Doe retaliated and “engaged
in bloody reprisals against suspected opponents from Gio and Mano ethnic groups and brutally
suppressed a military coup attempt on November 12, 1985, led by Patrick Qwiwonkpa, a Gio.”
Following his abortive coup, Thomas Quiwonkpa was captured by the Doe’s Krahn-dominated
army and executed in Monrovia and his body parts were displayed in many locations of the
capital city. Amnesty International reported in 1992 that, following the failed military coup, the
Krahn-dominated Liberian Armed Forces (AFL) subsequently implemented a vigorous
repression and all political opposition was abolished by Doe’s regime. On December 24, 1989,
Charles Ghankay Taylor launched a rebellious incursion from Ivory Coast into the Nimba
County. This action was also called a failed attempted coup by Doe’s government but Taylor
claimed to restore the people’s will for change.
In fact, Charles Taylor’s mother was a member of the Gola ethnic group, part of the
majority (mostly 95%) of the people who are indigenous in Liberia. His father was an American
Liberian (descended from African-American colonists) who worked as a teacher, sharecropper,
lawyer and judge. Charles Taylor rallied the civilians who were affiliated with victims of Doe’s
AFL forces. Grieving Gios and Manos also joined Taylor’s troops to retaliate against President
Samuel Doe’s regime. In June 1990, Gios and Manos orphans, seeking revenge, joined Charles
Taylor in great numbers.
UN bodies on the ground and the international community were unable to stop the
unlawful actions by Doe’s AFL troops. In fact, Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch
routinely reported human rights violations.
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Doe’s supporters from his own Krahn ethnic group perpetrated public executions and
armed attacks against civilian protests calling for Doe’s resignation. Even when those crimes
were reported to local law enforcement agencies, they remained unpunished.
Led by Charles Taylor, the rebel group adopted the name National Patriotic Front of
Liberia (NPFL) and received the support of the young people from the minority Gios and Manos
groups. The NPFL’s attack against the AFL troops was launched on December 24, 1989, into the
Nimba County and Doe’s AFL planned a strategic military response. Liberia fell into civil war
following an AFL counterinsurgency that caused 160,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) to
move in the direction of Guinea Conakry and Cote d’Ivoire. The number of IDPs reached
700,000 by the end of 1990.
Non-governmental organizations’ (NGOs) reports reveal, “on the night of July 29-30,
1990, AFL soldiers massacred some 600 people - mostly, Gios and Manos, many of them
women with children- who had sought refuge at St Peter’s Church in Monrovia”. Approximately
30 ethnic Krahn government soldiers carried out the Monrovia Church massacre. This was the
worst single atrocity of the First Liberian Civil War.
All parties ignored UN calls for peace. A Human Rights Watch report (2003) states that
the United Nations calls had a domino effect. In fact, “masked soldiers attacked the UN
compound in Monrovia, shooting indiscriminately and abducted 40 internally displaced persons
whose dead bodies were found in the bushy slums the following day on September 1990. That
level of sudden violence by the AFL caused the departure of UN personnel that did not return
until November 1990.” (HRW: 2003). This attack shows the inability of major nongovernmental
organizations and other religious associations on the ground to convince warring parties to
negotiate peace agreements after the departure of traumatized UN international staff.
18

On August 23, 1990, in accordance with the "ECOWAS Peace Plan for Liberia", 3,500
troops from ECOWAS Member States, including Nigeria, Ghana, Guinea, Sierra Leone, and
Gambia deployed to Liberia under the name of ECOMOG forces. Their mission was
peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance and their tasks included: the imposition of a ceasefire, the disarmament of the warring parties, ending the carnage of civilians, the imposition of an
embargo on the acquisition and import of arms, the establishment of an interim government and
preparation for elections and the evacuation of foreign nationals.
The United Nations field offices reopened in Liberia after the signature of two peaceagreements, one in Banjul (The Gambia) in August 1990 and a second one in Bamako (Mali) in
November 28, 1990. Taylor’s group planned strategies for revenge and looked for additional
funding in order to buy arms and ammunition to counter the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL)’s
military power. For example, illegal gold mining was one of the ways to create wealth to
purchase arms and other equipment. In addition, Charles Taylor and the NPFL targeted
“suspected supporters” of Doe’s regime.
Revengeful NPFL militants slaughtered civilians, burned down villages and plantations,
and looted businesses along the way. Anyone presumed to be a collaborator of the Krahns and
Mandingos was badly reprimanded. For example, the Grebo and Vai ethnic groups that were
business partners of the Mandingos and Krahns were threatened and forced to flee the country
and seek refuge in neighboring Ivory Coast. The NPFL employed brutal tactics aimed at
terrorizing the civilian population. NPFL rebels routinely mutilated female and male genitals
following rape and extensive torture sessions.
Taylor was against the deployment of ECOMOG which sought to protect the interim
government to bring peace. Taylor considered the force to be a threat to Liberia’s sovereignty
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because he claimed to be the Liberian legitimate leader. The transformation was complete after
ECOMOG helped to install the interim government in Monrovia. Simultaneously, Taylor formed
his own "government" in Gbarnga (Brown, 1999:10). These two acts deeply divided Liberia and
forced ECOMOG to choose sides in support of the interim government that was recognized by
ECOWAS and led by Amos Sawyer, former Vice-President of the dissolved National Assembly
who became the Interim President.
B. Role of ECOWAS
The Liberian case study demonstrates one of the most successful actions by a sub-regional
organization (ECOWAS) in terms of conflict management. Until summer 1990, Liberia’s civil
war spread throughout the country. NPFL militants surpassed all strategies of containment by the
Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL). All major European and American diplomatic missions in
Liberia issued simultaneous statements declaring the civil war as “collective suicide” and Liberia
as a “land of anarchy” (Amnesty International, 1999:2). Those official statements of foreign
governments were evidence of the seriousness of the first Liberian civil war and the need for
urgent action by the international community or other governments in the region to save
civilians, mostly women, young children, the elderly and the disabled.
ECOWAS was well informed about all atrocities committed by all sides. ECOWAS called an
emergency meeting and decided to create and deploy the Economic Community of West Africa
States Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) forces to Liberia. The former Nigerian President
His Excellency Ibrahim Babangida proposed the deployment of ECOMOG forces. ECOMOG
was first created in May 1990 and was deployed in August 25th 1990, under the name of
ECOMOG.
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C: The deployment of the ECOMOG forces
ECOMOG was a key component of the ECOWAS Peace Plan: The Peacemaking
Framework. The ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee (SMC) proposed it during its
meeting from 6 to 7 August 1990. The Organization of African Unity (now the African Union)
and the United Nations endorsed the plan. Michelle Pitts (Pitts, 1999:2) studied the deployment
of ECOMOG in Liberia and Sierra Leone. In August 1990, 2,700 ECOMOG troops deployed
from Sierra Leone, most of whom were Nigerians. Nigeria had 70,000 citizens living in Liberia
at the onset of the civil war, according to Brown (Brown: 1999:13). Nigerians were businessmen,
gold miners and fully integrated into the Liberian society.
According to Pitts, “the ECOMOG force commander, Ghanaian General Arnold Quainoo
believed that the presence of the West African force so near to Liberia's border would cause
factions to halt fighting in Liberia's capital of Monrovia.” (Pitts, 1999:4). Unfortunately, that was
not the case and tensions intensified between NPFL, AFL and local affiliates. Quainoo decided
to deploy troops into Liberia to protect civilians and negotiate a ceasefire. On 25 August 1990,
ECOMOG troops arrived in Monrovia. The presence of the large, well-equipped ECOMOG
forces frightened both the Liberian AFL and NPFL troops and led to a ceasefire. An interim
government was then put in place to handle urgent administrative tasks. Unfortunately, Taylor
refused to cooperate with the ECOMOG force. However, Taylor continued his efforts to try to
dominate and rule Liberia. His aggression led to substantial violence against civilian
communities. The ECOMOG deployment forced Taylor to revise his strategies.
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The failures of his strategies imposed his acceptance to join the negotiations of peace
agreements, signed in 1990 in Bamako - Mali (on 28 November 1990) and Banjul - The Gambia
(on 21 December 1990).
In her report to the US Department of State, Brown mentions “additionally, by 1995
ECOMOG had also assumed the onerous task of protecting some 160 United Nations Observer
Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) observers.” (Brown, 1999:11) Despite ECOMOG's multiple
personalities and ever-changing responsibilities, the body would facilitate thirteen peace
agreements; oversee the disarmament of 24,000 combatants; create a safe environment for
transparent elections; distribute ballot boxes and other election materials; and provide security
for the July 1997 presidential and national elections. (Brown, 1999:11).
The ECOMOG troops deployed for the first time in August 1990 in Monrovia as a
peacekeeping force but its duties expanded in response to the realities on the ground. In his book
named Liberia's Civil War: Nigeria, ECOMOG, and Regional Security in West Africa; Building
Peace in West Africa: Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea-Bissau, Adekeye Adebajo (2003)
describes the complexity of the ECOMOG mission in Liberia. Samuel Doe’s regime made
accusations of sabotage by other ECOWAS member states such as Nigeria and Ghana and
delayed consensus within ECOWAS. Burkina Faso and Libya were also accused of providing
military training and financial support to the 160 NPFL combatants who perpetrated the Nimba
County attack December 24, 1989. Therefore, it was difficult to reach an agreement on the
mandate of the ECOMOG mission. Some countries such as Senegal chose to remain neutral.
(HRW, 1993:6) Out of the fifteen member states, only four provided troops to ECOMOG
initially. ECOMOG troop contributions began with 3,000 soldiers and grew to 10,000 and
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12,000 troops with the vast majority coming from The Gambia, Ghana, Nigeria and Sierra Leone
(HRW, 1993:3). Mali joined later at the end of 1990.
After the November 1990 cease-fire, the Senegalese Armed Forces joined the ongoing
peace process in September 1991. The well-equipped ECOMOG forces kept Taylor’s troops out
of Monrovia, the capital city. Before its departure in 1998, ECOMOG force was the only source
of stability in Liberia. It had negotiated peace accords and cease-fires, disarmed rebels,
evacuated expatriates, and created conditions for transparent elections.

Map of Liberia:

Source: Google Maps
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Misunderstandings arose among deployed troops of the member states. Military management
was not smooth between French speaking countries and English speaking countries.
Tensions affected the management of the forces or interfered with ceasefire negotiations. In
addition, Taylor’s troops, Doe’s supporters and few community activists accused ECOMOG
forces of overstepping their mission. ECOMOG Field Commander Maj. General Adetunji Olurin
of Nigeria met with representatives of Diplomatic missions, NGOs and UN Staff on the ground
and explained, in details, the mandate of ECOMOG in order to appease their concerns related to
the reluctance of Liberia to cooperate. Olurin minimized Taylor’s criticism and assured that
ECOMOG peacekeeping force was supposed to act as an "impartial arbiter"(Raddatz, 2013:189).
Therefore, ECOMOG forces could not take sides with any party to the conflict whether it is AFL
or NPFL.
Together with the United Nations, ECOWAS organized a number of rounds of negotiations
to try to bring peace to Liberia. From 1990 to 1997 (year of election of President Charles
Ghankay Taylor), ECOWAS brokered the following peace process gatherings and included all
warring parties:
-

Banjul - The Gambia (August 1990);

-

Bamako - Mali (28 November 1990);

-

Banjul - The Gambia (December 1990);

-

Lomé - Togo (February 1991);

-

Yamoussoukro- Côte d’Ivoire (June 1991);

-

Yamoussoukro- Côte d’Ivoire (July 1991);

-

Yamoussoukro- Côte d’Ivoire (September 1991);

-

Yamoussoukro- Côte d’Ivoire (October 1991);
24

-

Cotonou - Benin (25 July 1993);

-

Akosombo and Accra- Ghana (1994);

-

Abuja I - Nigeria (19 August 1995);

-

Abuja II- Nigeria (17 August 1996).
The culminating Abuja agreement resulted in the holding of elections in 1997. The different

locations where negotiations took place, demonstrate strongly the collective willingness of
ECOWAS member states to find peaceful solutions to the first Liberian civil war. A report issued
in June 1993 by Human Rights Watch called ECOMOG, a “successful military intervention that
succeeded in temporarily stopping the bloodshed and ethnic killing” (HRW,1993:1).
Many international observers regarded ECOMOG as a model of regional conflict resolution.
This long lasting period of mediation among warring parties demonstrates the full commitment
of ECOWAS and UN to the peaceful resolutions of conflicts. The success of ECOMOG in
Liberia led to similar deployments in Sierra Leone and Cote d’Ivoire to carry out the same type
of missions.
D: Role of the United Nations in the Liberian civil wars
The United Nations issued its first resolution on the Liberian civil war more than two years
after the beginning of armed conflict. The United Nations Security Council resolution 788,
adopted unanimously on 19 November 1992, determined that the deterioration of the situation
in Liberia constituted a threat to international peace and security. The Council imposed an arms
embargo on the country for the purposes of establishing peace and stability. However, this
delayed response of UNSC led to increased military activities involving AFL troops, NPL militia
and civilians frustrated over the results of allegedly rigged elections of October 15, 1985.
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In 1993, pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution UNSCR 866 (1993), the United
Nations’ Observer Mission (UNOMIL) was created by the UN and was later entrusted with the
mandate to investigate and report on human rights violations in Liberia. UNOMIL had three
human rights officers with the responsibility of submitting human rights reports to the UN
Secretary-General. UNOMIL’s mandate expired at the end of September 1997. The United
Nations congratulated ECOWAS for its intervention in Liberia.
The UN Security Council resolution S/RES/788, dated 19 November 1992 “welcomed the
continued commitment of the ECOWAS and the efforts towards a peaceful resolution of the
Liberian conflict” (S/RES/788:1). The United Nations Security Council also invited “all States to
respect the measures established by ECOWAS to bring about a peaceful solution to the conflict
in Liberia”.( S/RES/788:1). The Security Council Resolution expressed appreciation for the
contributions of the European countries in line of ECOWAS recommendations. The UNSC also
“decided, under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, that all States shall, for the
purposes of establishing peace and stability in Liberia, immediately implement a general and
complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Liberia until the
Security Council decides otherwise.” (S/RES/788:2). This decision of the Security Council was
very much appreciated by ECOWAS.
The same UN resolution provided international legitimacy to ECOMOG forces and
facilitated the mission of its troops on the ground. In addition, it included an arms embargo and
imposed the elimination of all supplying routes for arms and ammunition to parties to the
conflict. This UN resolution gave credit to the ECOWAS political leadership in the region and
supported ECOMOG operations forces. Such operations intended the use of military capabilities
to overcome any rebel activities in the region.
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The UN resolution authorized therefore to impose order until the organization of free,
fair and peaceful democratic elections. The same UN resolution recommended the appointment
of a Special Representative to Liberia to evaluate the situation and report to the Security Council.
The Abuja II Peace Agreement of 1996 called for the organization of fair and democratic
elections on July 1, 1997. This mechanism was strongly supported by the United Nations. All
parties to the conflict were required to disarm, establish civilian political parties and participate
in the electoral campaign. Charles Taylor was elected President of Liberia. In addition to the UN,
the African Union and the Mano River Union framework also played significant roles.
Nevertheless, fighting continued and frustration with Charles Taylor’s corrupt and
repressive measures that ultimately led to his forced departure from the country into exile in
Nigeria. The AU launched a mission for Comprehensive Peace Agreement and reconstruction in
Liberia in 2004 following the Accra (Ghana, 2003) peace accord. Following the “rehatting” of
ECOMOG forces to Blue Helmets, many resolutions were taken by UN Security Council to
support the peacekeeping operations.
In the same year, the United Nations Security Council adopted two resolutions UNSCR
1497 (2003) and UNSCR 1509 (2003) to put in place the long-term United Nations Stabilization
force in Liberia (UNMIL). UNMIL relieved the ECOMOG forces and successfully completed its
mandate on 30 March 2018. The ECOMOG intervention caused numerous casualties in the
ranks of ECOWAS soldiers and all rebel groups. Weaknesses during the transitional period
between ECOMOG drawdown and the deployment of UNMIL served the NPFL to commit
atrocities. No official estimates of casualties were formally made by ECOWAS.
The United Nations re-hatted all ECOMOG forces as UN Peacekeepers and implemented
appropriate programs in line with the UNSCR 1325 (2000) that promoted the recruitment of
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females into the service. In Liberia, the ECOMOG mission has been able to counter military
actions against the rebel factions due to a strong commitment of member states to peace, security
and stability in the ECOWAS region. At the same time, local traditional and religious leaders’
participation to the success of ECOMOG mission cannot be ignored. Traditional leaders have
been very active in dissuading civilians from joining any parties to conflict and assisted
ECOMOG in gaining the confidence of the local communities. Also, the traditional leaders have
greatly contributed to ECOWAS’ efforts to bring peace in Liberia. They invited AFL and NPFL
to cease all military activities and resolve issues through a mediation process. Their actions
intended to influence peacefully the community and were a great contribution to ECOWAS
efforts in Liberia.
E: Lessons Learned
The Liberian civil wars lasted approximatively for seventeen years. During this time,
both ECOWAS and the United Nations continuously sought innovative and synergistic
approaches to peace operations in Liberia. The experience of ECOMOG forces to bring an end to
the first Liberian civil war was very relevant for preventing future threats in the region. The
deployment of ECOMOG forces remains vital to the preservation of the stability in the region.
The necessity and mandate of UN peacekeeping operations in Africa may be questioned since
the ECOMOG force was able to demonstrate the ability of ECOWAS to establish and maintain
peace in the region. Observations by High-level African Union (AU) appointees note that
ECOWAS should always request AU and UN Security Council support prior to actions.
ECOWAS officials responded that regional organizations are always implementing mediation or
preventive action while waiting for UN response to their request for international attention. They
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also note that the rapid onset of events on the ground may require sub-regional organizations to
act without consultation with regional or international support.
In that respect, I agree with Ruggeri, Andrea, Theodora-Ismene Gizelis, and Han
Dorussen (2013) who claim “interventions such as the United Nations Angola Verification
Mission III (UNAVEM) in Angola (1995) and ECOMOG intervention in Liberia (2003) are
good examples of sub-regional forces seeking to enforce or provide the context for
democratization in the long run.” The military operation was an option on the table in case of
Liberia.
The fact that ECOWAS undertook such initiative represented a significant shift in the
involvement of regional organizations in peace and security issues. Kwaja mentions, “this was
underscored by an earlier call by Boutros Boutros Ghali, the former Secretary General of the
United Nations, to the effect that regional organizations should reduce the pressure faced by the
United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in peacekeeping.” (Kwaja, 2017:57). In addition,
ECOWAS has a legal mandate provided by Member States to maintain peace and security in
West Africa. I concur with Chukwuma Osakwe that the deployment of “ECOMOG both in
Liberia and Sierra Leone had encountered many internal issues that influenced its legitimacy and
effectiveness” (Osakwe, 2017:109). There were a few problems between Nigeria and Ghana and
the “francophone countries”. Osakwe points out that Nigeria is unilateral funding of ECOMOG
operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone did not please Cote d’Ivoire and Senegal.
That caused those member states to remain neutral and negatively influenced the credibility of
ECOMOG’s mandate.
Nathalie E. Brown from the US Department of State explains, in great details, the issues
between ECOWAS member states that deter its effectiveness namely “language barriers, varying
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levels of economic and social development, the lack of a common currency and differing styles
of governance, including military dictatorships” (Brown, 1999: 2). Brown also reminds that
ECOWAS member states had different “experiments with Marxism and socialism quasi-success
and some of them underwent “several failures in instituting democratic practices”. (Brown, 1999:
2). Those factors were unfortunately “obstacles to the formation of a common market and
economic integration.” (Brown, 1999: 2). I also agree with the argument that UN mechanisms
are sometimes slow to respond to the urgent conditions and needs on the ground.
However, ECOWAS succeeded in restoring and maintaining peace and order in the region
without UN support. Brown states “over the objections of some member states, ECOWAS
created and deployed a military force to Liberia.” The five-nation 3,500-person force that landed
in Monrovia in 1990 would swell to a presence of more than 10,000 and represent the majority of
the Community by 1996. Before leaving Liberia in 1998, ECOMOG had negotiated peace
accords and cease-fires, disarmed rebels, evacuated expatriates, and created conditions for
transparent elections in July 1997.
The UN succeeded in shaping agreements and in the implementation of disarmament,
demobilization and reinsertion of former rebels in Liberia. The United Nations efficiently funded
programs that served civilians, women and children and its actions supported ECOWAS’ “noble
ambitions in establishing a permanent peacekeeping mechanism” despite the lack of sufficient
funding (Brown: 1999:17). The Gambian case will be discussed in Chapter IV to demonstrate the
necessary due diligence in the cooperation between the UN and ECOWAS.
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Chapter IV: The Gambia: A case study of preventive action to impose the rule of law

This chapter reviews the ECOWAS involvement and effectiveness in the peaceful transfer of
power in 2016 between the outgoing President of The Gambia, Alhadji Sheikh Professor Doctor
Yahya A.J.J Babili Mansa Jammeh, and the President-elect Adama Barrow. The Gambian
presidential election took place on December 1, 2016.

This chapter focuses on the crisis

following Jammeh’s refusal to respect the results of the presidential election, released on
December 1, 2016. It also emphasizes actions taken by ECOWAS to achieve a peaceful transfer
of power to President-elect Barrow. It also shows how a partnership among ECOWAS, the
African Union (AU), and the United Nations (UN) can help to prevent civil wars in West Africa
following elections.
The Gambia has been member of ECOWAS since its creation in 1975. In accordance with
the ECOWAS Mediation Guidelines, “electoral observation requires an invitation from national
authorities of ECOWAS Member States.” (ECOWAS, 2008, 3). During this presidential election,
Jammeh’s regime refused to allow the ECOWAS Observation Team to monitor the December
2016 presidential voting process.

In the case of The Gambia, negotiations for a peaceful transition following the election were
unsuccessful. However, in order to avoid bloodshed, ECOWAS deployed the ECOWAS Military
Intervention in The Gambia (ECOMIG), a multinational regional military force to ensure a
peaceful transition to the newly elected government, led by Adama Barrow.
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A: History of the conflict
President Jammeh came to power in The Gambia in 1994 following a military coup
against President Dawda Jawara. President Jammeh ruled with an iron fist. His brutality included
mass incarcerations that attracted the attention of the international community. According to
reports by Human Rights Watch (2015) and Amnesty International (2016), his opponents’
disappearances related to their protests against corruption, money-laundering crimes, and arms
trafficking. In May 2015, the US National Security Adviser Susan Rice mentioned in a public
statement that she was “deeply concerned about credible reports of torture, suspicious
disappearances and arbitrary detention at the government’s hands.” (HRW, 2016:2).
During years of dictatorship and political unrest, many of President Jammeh’s political
opponents were incarcerated and died in jail without formal trials or disappeared right after being
arrested by Gambian police or military forces. The Gambian law-enforcement agencies arrested,
in April 2016, Ebrima Solo Sandeng an opposition activist who died while in custody.
Nine former senior officials of the Gambian National Intelligence Agency (NIA) are currently
charged for Sandeng’s death and the torture of other opposition members. They remain in
custody awaiting trial.
The Government of Senegal suspected that President Jammeh supported the
Mouvement Democratique des Forces de la Casamance (MFDC), literally translated as
Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance, a rebel group claiming the independence of the
South of Senegal. MFDC has been at war against the Senegalese governmental Armed Forces
(SAF) since 1981 and Jammeh’s Djola ethnic group is dominant in Casamance. President
Jammeh’s party, the Alliance for Patriotic Reorientation and Construction (APRC) is believed to
include rebels from the south of Senegal.
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Both Senegalese governments and the majority of the Gambians believe MFDC rebels carried
out operations such as killings, sabotage of opposition protests and kidnappings from their base
in southern Senegal under President Jammeh’s instructions. In order to maintain influence over
the MFDC, President Jammeh often refused to cooperate with successive Senegalese Presidents
in the development of infrastructure projects and law-enforcement stations in Casamance (south
of Senegal). The government of Senegal needed the cooperation of The Gambia in order to
develop the southern part of their country by building the bridge over The Gambia River and
highways for public commute in their southern cities (such as Kolda, Ziguinchor, and Tanaff and
so on). (See map page 20).
B: Role of ECOWAS
Paul D Williams (IPI, 2018:2) states that on December 1, 2016, “Gambians took the
polls and successfully replaced then President Jammeh with current President Adama Barrow, a
novice in politics and candidate of the United Democratic Party (UDP). The results showed 45.5
percent of the polls voted for Adama Barrow and’s 36.7 percent for Jammeh.” (Williams,
2018:2).
President Jammeh conceded, during a televised speech, to Adama Barrow on the evening of
December 2, 2016 after the Gambian Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) proclaimed the
preliminary results declaring Adama Barrow President-elect. President Jammeh also saluted the
maturity of the Gambian people for participating in a free, fair and democratic election.
Nonetheless, President Jammeh’s party, the Alliance for Patriotic Reorientation and Construction
(APRC) filed a complaint charging that the elections were not free and fair and demanded a
recount.
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On December 6, 2016, the Gambian Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) issued a
second statement revising the initial results. The revisions showed a slight decrease of 20,000
votes from the 525,963 initially reported. However, the IEC confirmed that Adama Barrow won
the presidential election.
On December 9, 2016, President Jammeh surprisingly addressed Gambians on television
and announced his refusal to step down. President Jammeh claimed that the voting system was
rigged against him. President Jammeh dissolved the Gambian Independent Electoral
Commission (IEC).The Gambian Armed Forces (GAF) stormed the National Television Station
(called Gambia Radio and Television Services or GRTS), the Parliament and the IEC. At the
same time, President Jammeh called for the organization of a new presidential election. The 2017
Freedom Press report notes “Jammeh administration shut down internet access on the eve of
2016 presidential election for 48 hours.” (Freedom Press, 2017). President Jammeh attempted to
restrict public access to information about the voting process and election results.
Following urgent calls by ECOWAS Member States, Senegal and Nigeria, a high-level
ECOWAS-AU-UN delegation was dispatched on December 13, 2016, to Banjul, the Gambian
capitol to persuade Jammeh to leave office.
The delegation included Presidents Ellen Johnson Sirleaf (Liberia), Muhammadu Buhari
(Nigeria), Dramani John Mahama (Ghana), and Ernest Bai Koroma of Sierra Leone and the UN
Special Representative for West Africa and in the Sahel based in Senegal (UNOWAS),
Mohamed Ibn Chambas who was also a former ECOWAS High Commissioner. On December
17, 2016, eleven out of the fifteen Heads of ECOWAS Member States met for the Fiftieth
Ordinary Session of the ECOWAS Authority of Heads of State and Government, (also called the
Summit) in Abuja, in The Federal Republic of Nigeria.
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The Summit appointed His Excellency President Muhammadu Buhari (Nigeria) as the
Mediator, His Excellency President Dramani John Mahama (Ghana), Co-Mediator and
Excellencies Presidents Ellen Johnson Sirleaf (Liberia) and Ernest Bai Koroma of Sierra Leone
as members of the Standing Mediation Committee (SMC). Mr. Marcel A. de Souza, ECOWAS
High Commissioner implemented the decision by the Summit of ECOWAS Authority to start
mediation efforts under the leadership of the Standing Mediation Committee.

Map of The Gambia: (Source Google Maps)

C: Background of ECOWAS deployment in The Gambia (ECOMIG):
The Standing Mediation Committee (SMC) was sent to discuss the political impasse and
convince President Jammeh to accept the election results and hand over the power peacefully.
The ECOWAS Heads of State recognized Adama Barrow as President-elect of The Gambia. The
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Heads of State and Government also decided to participate in the formal inauguration of
Barrow’s presidency in Dakar on January 19, 2017. The ECOWAS Summit of Heads of States
declared its intent to take all necessary measures to enforce the results of the presidential election
as agreed in the final resolution of the 50th Summit.

This ECOWAS decision is in accordance with ECOWAS 2001 Protocol on
Democracy and Good Governance that defines 12 constitutional principles. Articles 1b and 1c
state “every accession to power must be made through free, fair and transparent elections” and
reflect the principle of “zero tolerance for power obtained by unconstitutional means.”
(ECOWAS: 2001). Hartmann notes “Chambas (a member of the ECOWAS-AU-UN delegation)
did not rule out this military possibility when asked if the UN would consider military action to
force Jammeh’s departure.” (Hartmann: 2017, 89). Hartmann also states that “Chambas declared
that ECOWAS would ask the UN Security Council to approve the deployment of troops to The
Gambia if Jammeh (refused) to cede power.” (Hartmann: 2017, 89). The 50th ECOWAS Summit
also agreed to guarantee the safety and protection of the President-elect Barrow.
Senegal proposed that President-elect Barrow and his family leave The Gambia and stay
temporarily in Dakar for their own safety. The African Union, the United Nations and ECOWAS
issued multiple joint declarations calling for President Jammeh to step down in order to preserve
peace. Alieu Momar Njai, President of the IEC oversaw the presidential election and received
death threats by the APRC, President Jammeh’s militants and the GAF. He fled the country and
sought refuge in Senegal on January 4, 2017. On January 13, 2017, further negotiations took
place between Buhari and President Jammeh in Banjul (The Gambia) without success.
Unfortunately, Jammeh resisted all efforts by the SMC.
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He claimed that peace in The Gambia depended on the reorganization of a new free, fair and
democratic presidential election that would reflect the true will of the Gambian people.
Buhari took Adama Barrow with him, on January 13, 2017, to the 27th France-Africa
Summit, held in Bamako (Mali). Adama Barrow participated in the 27th France-Africa Summit
as President-elect of The Gambia recognized by ECOWAS and France. At the conclusion of the
27th France-Africa Summit, ECOWAS Head of States and Government decided to implement
their decision, taken in Abuja (Nigeria) to “take all necessary measures to strictly enforce the
results of the 1st December 2016 elections” (ECOWAS Communique, December 2016).

The Heads of State and Government agreed to form and deploy the ECOMIG at the
conclusion of the 27th France-Africa Summit. The AU Peace and Security Council issued a
statement confirming that as of January 19, 2017 the AU would no longer recognize Jammeh as
the legitimate President of The Gambia. Hartmann reports “ECOWAS Chiefs of Staff gathered
in Abuja on January 14th, 2017 to discuss the preparations for the establishment of the ECOWAS
Military Intervention in The Gambia (ECOMIG).” (Hartmann, 2017, page 89)
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Arrival of ECOMIG forces in Banjul (The Gambia) on January 21 st 2017: Senegalese Troops
Source: Jeune Africa Newspaper
https://www.jeuneafrique.com/mag/398057/politique/gambie-retour-dernieres-heures-roi-jammeh/

A Nigerian Army Officer member of ECOMIG forces discussing with civilians in Banjul (The Gambia) on
January 25st 2017:
Source: Jeune Africa Newspaper
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The African Union Peace and Security Council and the United Nations Security
Council resolutions facilitated ECOMIG’s formation and authorized its deployment. A
Senegalese Army General Francois Ndiaye chaired the joint leadership of the ECOMIG forces.
On January 17, 2017, ECOMIG Senegalese Infantrymen started to move towards Farafenny, a
town on the northern border between Senegal and The Gambia. On January 17, 2017, President
Jammeh declared a state of emergency in The Gambia and deployed the Gambian Armed Forces
(GAF) in Banjul strategic locations and in other cities like Yundum, Birkama and Kanilai. That
same day, President Jammeh urged the Gambian Parliament, where his APRC party held the
majority of seats, to extend his mandate for three more months. On January 18, 2017, ECOMIG
troops comprised of Senegalese Special Forces with contingents of infantrymen from Ghana,
Nigeria, Mali and Togo gathered in Senegal.
On the afternoon of January 18, 2017, Senegalese Special Forces and the Togolese Army
arrived, by road, in Farafenny. At the same time, the Nigerian Air Force started its flyovers
above the Gambian territory to intimidate the GAF. The Nigerian Navy deployed its warships
around the Senegalese territorial waters and placed the Gambia under a blockade. The
ECOWAS forces were ready to intervene in The Gambia. ECOMIG forces managed to prevent
President Jammeh from implementing his military strategy to stay in power. President Yaya
Jammeh was aware of the expiration of his constitutional mandate on January 18, 2017, and
Jammeh was also fully informed about ECOMIG military strategies. President Jammeh visited
numerous ethnic leaders, tribal establishments and other religious congregations to seek
support and manpower.
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Despite President Jammeh’s call to arms, no civilians enlisted in the Gambian Army. On
January 18, 2017, the Gambian National Assembly met and passed a resolution to extend
Jammeh’s mandate for three more months.
The ECOMIG Joint Task-Force, (comprising ECOWAS, UNOWAS and the AU and a
military leadership from Member States) was set up in Dakar to coordinate events in The
Gambia. Mr. Marcel A. de Souza, ECOWAS High Commissioner sent a last warning to
President Jammeh. ECOWAS High Commissioner De Souza informed Jammeh that ECOMIG
forces would enter The Gambia on January 19th , 2017, at midnight. This was the same day
that Adama Barrow was scheduled to be sworn in as President of the country at the Gambian
High Commission in Dakar, Senegal in the presence of the majority of ECOWAS Heads of
States. Gambian ambassadors to the UN in New York and Geneva, the USA, Senegal, France
and Germany and senior military officers issued a collective statement calling on President
Jammeh to step down. The statement was presented to the UN Security Council.
At dawn on January 19, 2017, ECOMIG forces invaded The Gambia and “sporadic
fighting on the Gambian territory involved Senegalese troops and MFDC rebel units from
Casamance.” (Hartman, 2017, page 90). Approximatively, 7,000 troops as well as air and naval
assets from Ghana, Nigeria and Senegal entered The Gambia (Williams, 2017, page 2). The
Gambia’s Army Chief of Defence Staff, Lieutenant General Ousman Badgie was very aware of
the strength of ECOMIG battalions and its firepower. Lt-General Badgie made a public
statement pledging allegiance to the sworn President Adama Barrow and declared that his
forces would not fight against ECOMIG forces. Lieutenant General Ousman Badgie ordered
the GAF to surrender to ECOMIG forces and stay in their barracks until further notice.
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ECOMIG’s progress towards Banjul, the capital of The Gambia was stopped by “a
last-minute negotiation by Mauritania’s President and Former Army General Mohammed Ibn
Abdel Aziz, Guinea Conakry’s President Alpha Conde and UN Special Representative for
West Africa in Senegal (UNOWAS), Mohamed Ibn Chambas.” (Hartmann: 2017: 90).
President Jammeh agreed to step down and made a last public speech on early morning of
January 21, 2017, via the Gambian National Television to express his thanks to the Gambian
people. He proclaimed that he decided to relinquish the mantle of power in order “to preserve
in every instance and in every circumstance the lives of Gambians” and that “it is not necessary
that a single drop of blood is spent.” (Jammeh, last speech, January 20, 2017). Equatorial
Guinea offered asylum to Former President Jammeh and Chadian President Idris Deby Itno
provided his personal cargo plane for Jammeh’s transportation. ECOMIG forces were already
on the outskirts of the city of the capital city, Banjul and President Jammeh stepped down on
January 21, 2017.
According to The Gambia 2017 Human Rights Report by the US Embassy in Dakar,
“76,000 individuals reportedly fled to neighboring countries, the large majority of those going
to Senegal; 75% of them were women and children” (HRW: 2017). An ECOWAS-AU-UN
declaration was issued on January 21, 2017, praising the peaceful resolution of The Gambian
constitutional crisis. President Adama Barrow returned to The Gambia on January 26, 2017,
with ECOMIG military escort bodyguards.
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D: Role of the United Nations
The success of ECOMIG depended on coordination and cooperation among ECOWAS,
the AU and the UNSC. The Gambia case study shows the effectiveness of preventive diplomacy
carried out by the UN, AU and ECOWAS. UN Agencies have long suffered under the Jammeh
administration. Many restraining orders were issued against the United Nations High
Commission for Human Rights (UNCHR). The Jammeh administration also refused to facilitate
visits requested by the Special Rapporteurs on Torture and on Extrajudicial, Summary or
Arbitrary Executions in November 2014. On October 15, 2015, UN General Assembly elected
Senegal, Egypt, Japan and Uruguay as non-permanent members of UNSC, for two-year terms,
beginning January 1, 2016 (UN/DPI communiqué, 2015).
As a member of the UNSC, Senegal was able to request the UNSC to meet about urgent
matters in the region, in the case of The Gambia. Also, in a letter S/2016/89, dated 28 January
2016, the President of the Security Council exchanged views with the UN Secretary-General
about the political and security situation in West Africa and in the Sahel region. The President of
the Security Council recommended the use of preventive diplomacy by the United Nations
Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS) to solve the Gambian crisis. In a letter dated
10 February 2016, the President of the Security Council informed the UN Secretary-General that
the Council had decided to send a mission to West Africa (Mali, Guinea-Bissau and Senegal).
The President of the Security Council communicated, the composition of the mission and its
terms of reference to the Secretary-General in a letter referenced S/2016/215, dated 7 March
2016. The same letter explained that the intent of the mission was to assess conditions for free,
fair, peaceful, inclusive and credible presidential elections in the Niger, Benin, Cabo Verde,
Ghana and The Gambia.
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The same mission was assigned to discuss matters about the political situation in Chad.
The UNSC report regarding the mission sent to Senegal, Guinea-Bissau and Mali was released
under S/2016/511, dated 11 May 2016. The mission was also assigned to express the support of
the Council to the cooperation between ECOWAS, the United Nations Office for West Africa
and the Sahel (UNOWAS), the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa (UNOCA),
the Lake Chad Basin Commission, and other relevant multilateral and regional organizations to
assist the region to address its political and security challenges (UNSC report S/2016/511, dated
11 May 2016).
According to Amnesty International’s report in 2016, “the UN, AU and ECOWAS also
undertook a joint mission to Banjul in May 2016 to assess compliance with regional and subregional standards on elections, democracy, human rights and governance in the Gambia.”
(Amnesty International, 2016). Conclusions of that report raised concerns over arrests of
civilians and opposition figures on May 14 and 16, 2016. The three organizations urged The
Gambia to guarantee conditions for independent and credible investigations.
On December 9, 2016, Senegal’s Foreign Minister, Mankeur Ndiaye, speaking on a
Senegalese television station Tele Futurs Medias (TFM), also asked President Jammeh to respect
the election verdict and “solemnly” warned him not to harm Senegal’s interests or its citizens in
the The Gambia. Minister Ndiaye also mentioned that Senegal would call for an emergency
meeting of the UN Security Council about The Gambia. The United Nations supported
ECOWAS’ efforts to establish constitutional rule in the Gambia and to guarantee the safety and
the rights of former President Jammeh (in accordance with the 1997 Gambian Constitution about
the Status of a Former Head of State).
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The United Nations Security Council issued a Presidential statement, S/PRST/2016/9, dated
21 December 2016 to welcome decisions made by ECOWAS at its 50th Summit on December
17, 2016 in Abuja (Nigeria) regarding the Gambian electoral crisis. On January 13, 2017,
Mohamed Ibn Chambas, UN Special Representative for West Africa and in the Sahel based in
Senegal (UNOWAS), briefed the Security Council about the latest developments on the ground.
(ref: S/PRST/2017/2, dated 20 January 2017). Following Chambas’ briefing, the Security
Council supported ECOWAS’ decisions to cease recognizing Jammeh as President of The
Gambia, on January 19, 2017. (ref: S/PRST/2017/2, dated 20 January 2017). In addition, the
UNSC commended the efforts of the African Union and ECOWAS, as well as Member States in
West Africa and in the Sahel to strengthen border security and regional cooperation. (ref:
S/PRST/2017/2, dated 20 January 2017). Mr. Chambas was also assigned by the UNSC to
support ECOWAS initiatives to facilitate negotiations and to ensure a peaceful transfer of power
from outgoing President Jammeh to the President-elect Adama Barrow.

The United Nations Security Council accepted the requests of Senegal and the African Union
for an emergency meeting. The UNSC adopted resolution S/RES/2337 (2017) during its 7866 th
meeting on 19 January 2017. The resolution S/RES/2337 “endorses the ECOWAS and the
African Union decisions to recognize Mr. Adama Barrow as President of the Gambia and calls
upon the countries in the region and the relevant regional organizations to cooperate with
President Barrow in his efforts to realize the transition of power.” (UNSCR 2337 (2017)). On
January 25, 2017, Security Council members received a follow-up briefing, via video
teleconference by Chambas on the conditions of President Jammeh’s peaceful departure.
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E: Lessons Learned

This Gambian case study demonstrates the effectiveness of cooperation among ECOWAS,
AU and the United Nations. Paul D Williams (2017) cites a statement by Ghana President Nana
Akufo-Addo on January 18, 2017, that

summarizes the mission’s purpose: “ECOMIG’s

objective was to create an enabling environment for the effective enforcement of the rule of law,
and, in accordance with the Constitution of The Gambia, facilitate the inauguration of the
President-Elect, Adama Barrow, on Thursday January 19, 2017.” (IPI: Williams: 2017, online).
Williams praises the solidarity of ECOWAS Member States in restoring constitutional order in
The Gambia. In fact, ECOMIG’s force Commander, General Francois Ndiaye, explained on
January 31, 2017, that the mission’s three-part mandate was “to uphold the results of the
presidential election of December 1, 2016; ensure that the president-elect was sworn into office
on January 19, 2017, in conformity with the constitution of the Republic of The Gambia; and
ensure the safety of President Barrow, political leaders and the entire population.” (IPI:
Williams: 2017, online). ECOMIG carried out successfully its mandate in The Gambia.

This chapter reviews the efficiency of ECOWAS in maintaining peace and order during the 2016
Gambian presidential election through a combination of diplomacy and military intervention. I
argue that the United Nations learned lessons from Liberia’s first civil war about how best to
provide assistance through preventive diplomacy to support free and fair elections and peaceful
transition of power in West Africa. The United Nations Security Council involved all relevant
regional (the African Union) and sub-regional organizations (ECOWAS) in the discussions about
the crisis in The Gambia. Each of ECOMIG’s components demonstrated full commitment to
ensure its duties and guaranteed mechanisms to prevent any disagreements. This confirms my
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argument in support to Lise Morjé Howard’s assertion (Howard, 2007) that UN Headquarters
and UNSC interests to matters discussed facilitate their rapid solutions. The UN Security
Council’s interests in the post-election crisis facilitated funding of the ECOMIG deployment and
UNSC resolutions provided legitimacy to the initiatives taken by the AU and ECOWAS.

The deployment of ECOMIG facilitated the implementation of the UNSC resolution calling
on all sides to exercise restraint in order to ensure peace. The presence of Senegal at the Security
Council certainly played a major role in bringing the urgency of The Gambia crisis to the
attention of the members of the UNSC. The United Nations Security Council resolution on The
Gambia enabled all parties involved to participate in a peaceful transfer of power. UNSC
meetings sent a strong message to potential dictatorships in the region that they are expected to
respect their constitutions. The UNSC resolution and presidential statement generated support to
UNOWAS leadership in the region for its efforts to settle peacefully the Gambian crisis.
UNOWAS’ tremendous contribution to monitor the 2016 presidential election concluded
a series of events that intended to prevent chaos in the West African region. A new era started in
The Gambia with President Jammeh’s peaceful departure and the formal inauguration of Adama
Barrow as democratically elected president. President Adama Barrow established a Joint
Transition Team, on February 15, 2017, with the support of UNOWAS to ensure a smooth and
peaceful transition. In February 18, 2017, President Adama Barrow took his oath of office during
an independence celebration in Banjul (The Gambia) under the protection of ECOMIG forces.
The original mandate was adopted by the 51st ordinary session of the Authority held on Sunday
June 4, 2017 in Monrovia, Liberia. (ECOWAS: April 2017). Even today, President Jammeh still
has the strong support of the Gambian Armed Forces. That can be a threat to peace and security
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in The Gambia. In addition, the current trials of former officials of Jammeh regime may generate
frustration and unpredictable events. On April 21, 2017, ECOWAS forces clashed with Gambian
soldiers loyal to President Jammeh, shooting and injuring three who were guarding graves at his
home. The Gambia Armed Forces spokesperson said there was a misunderstanding and an
investigation is in progress. In a separate event, one civilian was killed during a protest against
ECOWAS forces while another civilian and an ECOMIG officer were injured on 2 June 2017.
Twenty-two arrests were made in connection with that event. On June 2, 2017, Senegalese
soldiers in Kanilai also wounded nine, shot dead one protester, as they opened fire on protesters
in "self-defense" during an uprising in which thousands demonstrated against the heavy
ECOMIG military presence in their community.

Twelve out of the fifteen Heads of State and Government of the Community voted to
maintain ECOMIG for the protection of the Gambian Cabinet members, diplomats and other
administrative leadership and security in The Gambia. Those were reasons for the extension of
ECOMIG mandate until June 9, 2019. The ECOMIG deployment protected the principles
enshrined in the Gambian constitution, democratic process and the will of the Gambian citizens.
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ECOMIG Headquarters based in Senegal:

Source: ECOWAS website

The ECOMIG caused President Jammeh to fail in his attempts to retain power after losing a
free and fair election and set an example in the West Africa region. ECOWAS Member States
were unified in their efforts toward a common goal: enforcing the rule of law and ensuring the
respect of the will of the people. ECOWAS reminds all Heads of State in the region of their
obligation to respect provisions 23 (4) of the AU Charter on Democracy, Elections and
Governance and the ECOWAS Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance,
adopted in 2001. In this particular case, ECOMIG successfully removed a dictator and enforced
the civilians’ will for change. Forcing President Jammeh to leave peacefully power was a great
achievement by ECOMIG. Thomas Weiss states “UN peacekeepers are now being asked to
meet the challenge of intra-state conflicts, assist in civil administration, and protect humanitarian
convoys.” (Weiss, 1996). But this type of stabilization is different from the “traditional view of
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peacekeeping operation as interposition of a neutral force between two warring states once a
ceasefire had been agreed to.” (Weiss, 1995).

In comparison with the Liberia situation, ECOWAS Heads of State and Government were
unified in their efforts to ensure a peaceful transition of power in The Gambia. Their resolve in
the Gambia crisis reassured the international community and convinced major powers such as
the USA and the European Union (EU) to support their collective efforts. The EU contributed
over seven millions euros to support ECOMIG efforts. The Gambia’s Chief of Defence Staff
(CDS) Major-General Yankuba Drammeh was nominated by President Adama Barrow to replace
CDS Lieutenant General Ousman Badgie. The Gambian new CDS thanked ECOWAS, on many
occasions, for deploying ECOMIG, and the Nigerian Banks for their efforts in enhancing the
welfare of the Gambians and the troops. The use of diplomacy worked in the case of The
Gambia, maybe due to the presence of Senegal, an ECOWAS Member State, at the time of the
conflict to the Security Council. Consequently, the creation of the tripartite mechanism can
facilitate an easy communication with UNSC, AU and ECOWAS respective leadership. The
success of ECOMIG in The Gambia proved that a diplomatic/military option by sub-regional
organizations, with the support of the UN can be effective in preventing temptations by
governments to circumvent the popular vote. The efficiency of ECOMIG affirmed the necessity
to create a permanent mechanism, including components from the United Nations, the African
Union and ECOWAS and based in the West African region. The proposal of a permanent
mechanism of cooperation between ECOWAS, UN and the AU will be discussed in the policy
recommendations.
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Chapter V: Policy recommendations

A: Evaluation of the role of the UN in both case studies in West Africa
This chapter summarizes my conclusions regarding UN contributions to bring peace to the
ECOWAS region and recommends the creation of a new partnership to provide timely
peacekeeping operations in West Africa.
The United Nations recognizes that it is not well suited to undertake peace-keeping or
counterterrorism operations in situations where conflicts are on-going. (United Nations HIPPO
report, 2015). In the case of Liberia’s first civil war, the first UN resolution was issued three
years after the beginning of the hostilities and the deployment of ECOMOG forces. This delay
hindered ECOWAS’ efforts to contain NPFL strategies. Unfortunately, Liberian leader Charles
Taylor heavily criticized the ECOMOG deployment over its actions and the legitimacy of its
mission. However, after Charles Taylor was forced out of office in 2003, the UN worked with
ECOWAS in taking on a more active and positive role.
In the case of The Gambia, the UNSC, with the support of the AU’s Peace and Security
Council (AUPSC), adopted a resolution, in less than twenty days, after the first public statement
by ECOWAS. This timely action by the UNSC was critical to the success of the ECOWAS
mission. The joint actions by UN/AU/ECOWAS showed a willingness to prevent the
destabilization of the region. The West-African sub-region is already traumatized with violence
in Mali where ECOWAS troops lost many soldiers.

50

B: Assessment of the UN’s current roles in West Africa
As early as 1992, UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, called upon regional
organizations to relieve the pressure on UN peacekeeping operations by taking the lead in
regional conflicts. UNSG Boutros-Ghali stated “moreover, should the Council choose
specifically to authorize a regional arrangement or organization to take the lead in addressing a
crisis within its region, that could serve to lend the weight of the United Nations to the validity of
the regional effort. “ (UN Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council: Agenda For Peace,
1992, 825). UNSG Boutros-Ghali understood very early that regional organizations must be
very involved in the resolutions of crises within their regions.

UN Peacekeeping Operations in Africa: Uniformed Personnel
Source: Council of Foreign Relations
Note: This Map is dated March 31, 2015 while UNOCI was closed in 2017.
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This map shows also that major peacekeeping efforts are still ongoing in West Africa. The
United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI) successfully completed its mandate on 30
June 2017, bringing closure to many years of civil war. The United Nations has learned a great
deal from civil wars in West Africa, including Liberia, Sierra Leone, Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea
Bissau, Mali and from the political crisis in The Gambia. In both Liberia and The Gambia case
studies, the United Nations has made much progress in supporting ECOWAS resolutions.
During the 70th Session of the General Assembly, the UN Secretary General (UNSG) Ban
Ki-moon transmitted a report, on September 2, 2015, to the President of the UN General
Assembly (UN-GA) and the President of the UN Security Council, by the High-Level
Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO). José Ramos-Horta, the former Head of State
of Timor-Leste, chaired the Panel. The HIPPO report reflects extensive consultations with
Member States, regional and sub-regional organizations, civil society, research organizations and
all relevant entities within the broad UN system. In his transmittal letter to the President of the
GA, The UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon stated “the Security Council has at times been
hesitant to consider crises at an early stage. The good offices of the Secretary-General have
proven to be a preventive tool.” (UN HIPPO report A/7095-S/2015/446, 2015, 8).
Currently there are two major UN-led peacekeeping operations in the ECOWAS region:
the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) and the United
Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). MINURSO
was established by Security Council resolution 690, dated 29 April 1991 in accordance with
settlement proposals accepted on 30 August 1988 by Morocco and the Frente Popular para la
Liberación de Saguia el-Hamra y de Río de Oro (Frente POLISARIO). (United Nations website).
In Mali, the conflict is between the government and rival factions. The MINUSMA was
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established by Security Council resolution 2100, dated 25 April 2013 to support political
processes in Mali and to carry out a number of tasks in support of the implementation of the
2015 Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali. (United Nations website). The Security
Council unanimously adopted the resolution 2423 (2018) under Chapter VII of the United
Nations Charter to extend the MINUSMA’s mandate through June 30, 2019.
C: ECOWAS contributions to the success of UN Peace Operations
Howard argues that the three components of successful peacekeeping operations are “the consent
of the warring parties for the UN operation, consensual but moderately intense Security Council
interests, and the first-level organizational learning in the UN Secretariat’s peacekeeping
operation.” (Howard, 2008, page 327). Therefore, the UN may have been delayed entering
Liberia due to lack of interest by the Security Council, considerations related to sovereignty, and
the absence of a request to intervene by parties involved.
However, since the late 1990s, ECOWAS, has taken actions to prevent civil wars within
its Member States. The initiative of ECOWAS and ECOMOG’s timely deployment saved lives
and prevented casualties on all sides during the Liberia’s fist civil war. The UN and AU
resolutions were adopted after time-consuming sessions and there would have been many more
casualties if ECOWAS had waited. That demonstrates the necessity for effective cooperation
among the three entities to manage current crises and prevent outbreaks of violence in the future.
The contributions of ECOWAS Member States to the successful outcomes of UN
operations was greatly appreciated by the international community. (resolution 788 (1992) on
Liberia, resolution 1132 (1997) on Sierra Leone, resolution 1528 (2004) on Cote d’Ivoire to
name a few).

The report entitled “Lessons from ECOWAS Peacekeeping Operations: 1990-

2004” was issued in 2005 following ECOWAS workshops in Accra (Ghana) between 10 and
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11th of February 2005. The report recommended that the United Nations should cooperate with
ECOWAS in order to be effective in carrying out its obligation to “guarantee peace and security
around the world” (UN Charter), especially in West Africa. From my review of the experiences
in Liberia and The Gambia, I have concluded that the United Nations should recognize that
regional organizations are capable of playing major roles in preventing civil crises and restoring
constitutional order and peace.

D: The creation of a triangular mechanism of cooperation among UN, AU and ECOWAS
Ian Martin states “ while the UN peacekeeping model is not found to be well-suited to
enforcement, counter-terrorism or trans-national operations, the AU, sub-regional organisations
and ad hoc regional coalitions have developed capabilities designed to address these challenges.
These African capabilities help relieve the pressure on the UN to conduct such operations.”
(Cedric de Coning, 2018, 225). Observers also note that in a world full of emerging threats,
“partnership peacekeeping has become the norm. This entails collaboration on active military
operations between two or more multilateral institutions or various bilateral actors. (CSR:
2018:6).
In fact, UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres and AU Chairperson Moussa Faki Mahama
organized, on July 9, 2018, a joint press conference in Addis-Ababa (Ethiopia) following the
closing of the 12th Annual Joint Consultative Meeting of the UN Security Council and the AU
Peace and Security Council. (Forti and Connolly: 2018, 1). Both leaders signed the 2017 Joint
UN-AU Framework for Enhanced Partnership in Peace and Security. This instrument facilitated
the contributions of African troops, representing 49 per cent of UN forces deployed in
peacekeeping operations. It also demonstrates the resolve of both institutions to take collective
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actions to prevent regional or sub-regional conflicts and align strategies on politically sensitive
situations in Africa. I argue that, while the UN has a very productive mechanism of cooperation
with the AU, a joint and permanent mechanism among the UN, The AU and the ECOWAS is
required in order to implement the recommendations of the High-Level Independent Panel on
Peace Operations. Such a triangular arrangement or partnership should be based in West Africa.
The governance structure should include a representative of UNOWAS on behalf of the UN, a
Permanent Representative from the ECOWAS Peace and Security Commission (ECOWASPSC) and a Permanent Representative from the AU Peace and Security Council (AUPSC).
This chapter concludes a joint mechanism that includes regional organizations should
manage Peacekeeping Operations in West Africa. Peace operations would be shorter, more
efficient and cost-effective with the rapid mobilization of ECOWAS’ manpower and military
assets. This joint mechanism would facilitate the timely implementation of resolutions taken by
the ECOWAS Emergency Meeting of Heads of States and Government, AUPSC and the UNSC,
pursuant to requests for intervention by offices on the ground.
As of now, it is crucial that the UN cooperate with regional organizations such as ECOWAS
to benefit from their full understanding and thorough knowledge of the host country and for the
deployment of an effective ECOWAS force. When first-level the UN with the cooperation of
ECOWAS successfully achieves learning of a crisis, then appropriate measures can be proposed
by UN/AU/ECOWAS representatives and approved by the UNSC. The proposed mechanism
would be funded in part by international donors with the support of the UN SecretariatGeneral, the AU Commission for Peace and Security and the High Commission of ECOWAS.
The creation of a permanent mechanism could have the capabilities to gather the Chiefs of
Staff of ECOWAS Member States, following an Emergency Summit on urgent cases and
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therefore guarantee a rapid mobilization of troops, if necessary. I trust this mechanism can
benefit by funding from donors with the support of the UN Secretariat-General Office, the AU
Commission for Peace and Security and the High Commission of ECOWAS.
The ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (2008) would guarantee the legitimacy
of a rapid deployment of ECOWAS forces with the full support of the UN and the AU. The
UN/AU/ECOWAS mechanism would be responsible for the mobilization and training of troops
in accordance with UN standards and facilitate funding for military assets and operational
capacities. The proposed mechanism UN/AU/ECOWAS would authorize ECOWAS to lead an
intervention in West Africa as provided for by the ECOWAS Mechanism for Conflict
Prevention, Management and Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security (CPMRPS), adopted by the
Heads of State and Government on December 10, 1999 in Lome (Togo). ECOWAS has the right
to intervene through military force if the ECOWAS SMC fails to use preventive diplomacy and
persuade all involved parties. Article 49 (d) from the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework
-ECOWAS-CPF- (regulation MSC/REG.1/01/2008), dated January 16th, 2008, explicitly states
that “the Mediation and the Security Council may authorize the preventive deployment of
ECOWAS Standby Force (ESF) to the territory of a Member State for the purpose of preventing
the degeneration of conflict into violence or to serve as buffer between belligerents during
periods of high tension, mediation or peace-keeping operations as stipulated by Article 27 of the
Mechanism.” (ECOWAS-CPF, 2008, 25).
The UN/AU/ECOWAS mechanism would be responsible for the mobilization and
training of troops in accordance with the UN standards and facilitate funding for military assets
and operational capacities. The existing UN-AU partnership would ensure respect for UN
standards in terms of troop qualifications and training, leadership experience, and an adequate
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level of supplies. As they share similar cultural backgrounds, ECOWAS forces would be in a
better position to understand the social and cultural factors that are important to local ethnic or
religious groups, including the protection of intangible cultural heritage and artefacts.
Communication would not be a problem as the majority of the West African countries share
regional languages. Regional forces would have an advantage in gathering intelligence that is
critical in minimizing casualties among civilians.
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Peace Operations in Africa since 2000
Source: Africa Center for Strategic Studies
https://africacenter.org/publication/peace-operations-in-africa-lessons-learned-since-2000/
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I believe that “responses to contemporary conflicts are increasingly robust and regional
organizations are better equipped than the UN to execute them.” (Peter: 2019, 5). New types of
threats in West Africa will challenge the capabilities of the United Nations to carry out
peacekeeping operations in the region. For example, terrorist attacks by many groups in Mali
caused high casualties among MINUSMA personnel. There is a threat of further casualties
related to the continuing Boko Haram insurgency and instability in Niger, Nigeria and Burkina
Faso. It is not only the efficiency, but also the legitimacy of the regional organization in the eyes
of the regional governments and affected communities that plays a role in the success of
peacekeeping operations.
E: Operational Issues
Former UNSG Ban Ki-moon noted in the 2015 HIPPO report that “the international peace
and security responsibilities shouldered by the African Union and regional economic
communities and regional mechanisms in Africa have grown enormously in recent years. They
represent a significant human and financial burden.” The question of funding is always a
challenge to ECOWAS peacekeeping operations. The African Union does not have the financial
resources to support a multinational peacekeeping operation; it can cover only twenty-five per
cent of its current obligations. The AU relies on international financial support to implement
peacekeeping operations in Africa. Therefore, a reliable funding mechanism would have to be
established. The joint UN/AU/ECOWAS mechanism could mobilize financial resources through
the UN, as was the case in The Gambia. However, the UN General Assembly is the body that
approves the budget and the GA Member States would have the final say.
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This institutional framework could have legal capacities and diplomatic attributions,
transferred by the UN Secretary-General to discuss, mediate, negotiate, fund and decide on
various issues related peace and security in ECOWAS region under the joint leadership of the
UNOWAS

Permanent

Representative,

Representative, the

ECOWAS

High-Commissioner or his/her

the President of the ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee or his/her

representative and the AU Peace and Security Commissioner or his/her representative. The
cooperation among UN, AU and ECOWAS troops would help to incorporate the contributions of
traditional leaders in the host country.
The UN should explore the possibility of appointing an Under-Secretary-General of the
United Nations or a Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General to lead the (UN/AU/
ECOWAS) mechanism. The UNOWAS can also assist the appointed Under-Secretary-General
of the United Nations or a Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General to lead the
(UN/AU/ ECOWAS) mechanism and represent him/her depending on the workload to the
number of side-meetings during mediation and negotiation.
Finally, there is a large body of commentary recommending a more formal arrangement
for coordinating peace operations undertaken by the UN, the AU and ECOWAS. The success of
recent preventive action in The Gambia in 2016 should convince the leadership of the respective
organizations – UN, AU, and ECOWAS - to explore the possibility of establishing the proposed
triangular mechanism.
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Conclusion
ECOWAS was created in 1975 to promote economic integration among the Member States and
to support cooperation for economic growth and development. Since the 1990s, its mission has
been expanded to include peacekeeping operations and missions to support ECOWAS Member
States in their efforts to become stable, constitutional democracies. All ECOWAS Member
States are committed to the principles of the UN Charter. ECOWAS has made progress in
negotiating political commitments among Member States in the area of peace and security. The
adoption of the ECOWAS Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution,
Peacekeeping and Security (CPMRPS), adopted by the Heads of State and Government on
December 10, 1999, in Lome (Togo) and the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework ECOWAS-CPF (regulation MSC/REG.1/01/2008), dated January 16th, 2008, are examples of
that progress.
In addition, former UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali understood very early that
regional organizations must be very involved in the resolutions of crises within their regions.
Former UN Secretary-General Kofi A. Annan also used his goodwill to prevent bloodshed in
West Africa. Former UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon instructed the evaluation of
peacekeeping operations around the World. The United Nations recognized ECOWAS
contributions to the success of UN peacekeeping operations (HIPPO 2015). The signing of 2017
Joint UN-AU Framework for Enhanced Partnership in Peace and Security between the UN and
the AU and the closing statements by the current UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres and
AUPSC Commissioner Moussa Faki Mahama at the 12th Annual Joint Consultative Meeting of
the UN Security Council and the AU Peace and Security Council, on July 9, 2018 demonstrate
that willingness to share responsibilities to maintain order, peace and democracy in Africa.
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I explored the UN/ECOWAS cooperation during the first Liberian crisis (1989-1990) with
the first deployment of ECOMOG. Also, through my research I found evidence that the
partnership among the UN, the AU and ECOWAS during The Gambia’s crisis in 2016 was
successful. More positively the sustained interest and cooperation of the UNSC was essential to
the success of the ECOMIG deployment in the Gambia. I concluded that the establishment of a
proposed triangular UN/AU/ECOWAS would enhance the authority of the UN in West Africa.
At least two ECOWAS Member States, Guinea and Cote d’Ivoire, will organize national
elections in the near future. Both countries are experiencing internal conflicts that could lead to
pre- or post-electoral violence if preventive actions are not taken by sub-regional (ECOWAS),
regional (AU) and international actors (UN) in a timely fashion. The proposed mechanism would
generate effective actions through preventive diplomacy and, if needed, authorize and jointly
manage the deployment of ECOWAS forces, where required, to ensure peace and security in
West Africa.
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